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
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# Afghanistan Situation Report



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27 November 1984

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## AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

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A recent upsurge of emigration by educated Kabulis is caused by regime pressure to join the ruling party.

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most Afghan leaders and insurgents fight to free their villages and local areas of foreign troops, and join a larger fundamentalist or moderate exile group to get weapons and supplies. Religious ideology plays a subordinate role in most groups. The fundamentalists have the largest following because they receive more external aid, are better organized, and are fighting more effectively than the moderates.

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**EXODUS OF EDUCATED AFGHANS**

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According to US Embassy reports, a recent upsurge in emigration of educated Kabulis has resulted from regime pressure to join the ruling party or lose their jobs. The UNDP reported difficulty finding suitable replacements for white-collar staff members who had fled. Afghan employees of other embassies and successful Afghan businessmen were also among those who had left Kabul or were planning to leave for Pakistan and India.

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**Comment:**

Most educated Afghans fled the country after the Communist takeover in 1978. The few who remained probably have cooperated with the regime only to maintain their livelihoods. Their exodus is likely to increase the inefficiency of the bureaucracy and, if the Communists continue to have problems developing cadre, slow the growth of Communist control.

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**IN BRIEF**

-- Insurgent forces in Kabul fired 24 rockets in 45 minutes during the middle of the night of 25 November, according to US Embassy reports. The attack, one of the most intense since the Soviet invasion, occurred in the face of recent Soviet efforts to upgrade Kabul's security.

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## **PERSPECTIVE**

### **FUNDAMENTALISTS AND MODERATES IN THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE**

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#### **Why Afghans Fight**

Interviews with Afghan leaders and insurgents in Pakistan indicate that many insurgents are motivated primarily by a desire to free their villages and valleys of foreign troops. Others are fighting for national freedom and independence. Belief in Islam drives a smaller number, and some fight because war offers booty or plunder.

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The interviews also indicate that the majority of guerrillas belong to small, self-contained units that do not often require outside support. Some insurgents, however, join a larger political organization, usually one of the six main exile groups headquartered in Peshawar.

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Potential guerrilla fighters sometimes approach these groups as individuals, but more often they come in small bands organized along traditional kinship or tribal lines. In the traditionally structured Afghan society, most insurgents follow their village, tribal, or ethnic leaders, who decide which group their men will join.

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There are a number of advantages to association with a larger exile organization:

-- These groups offer materials, mostly arms, that are not available from other sources, especially antitank and antiaircraft weapons. The interviews indicated that there are many more men ready to fight than can be armed and that the resistance organizations can accommodate only a fraction of the potential insurgents.

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-- The main insurgent groups in Pakistan offer an organizational structure. They can offer tactical leadership and training as well as networks of communications in the field to help coordinate guerrilla activity.

-- Some resistance organizations in Pakistan offer an ideological base that is important to some of the guerrillas. ☐

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### **The Fundamentalists**

The fundamentalists have the largest following. The interviews indicate that they are generally younger, better organized, much better financed, and benefit from their connections to the Muslim Brotherhood. Fundamentalist leaders generally come from the urban middle and lower classes of Kabul; many were students or faculty at Kabul University. They are suspicious of both East and West. ☐

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The fundamentalists seek to reorder Afghan society on Islamic principles. The extremists among them favor an Iranian-style government and society in Afghanistan. Others are less doctrinaire, open to compromise, and, like the moderates, acknowledge the need for coexistence with the USSR and have ties with Afghan exiles in the West. ☐

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The fundamentalists' appeal is based on more than religious fervor.

-- They are better connected with fundamentalist groups in Pakistan and throughout the Islamic world, especially the Gulf. These groups funnel resources to the fundamentalists in preference to the moderates. Guerrilla leaders looking for resources to fight in Afghanistan are naturally drawn to those with the most to offer.

-- The fundamentalists have a better and more established organization than the moderates, having left Afghanistan to begin fighting in 1973-74. Most moderates left Afghanistan in 1978.

-- The fundamentalists now have the upper hand in much of the fighting, and many guerrilla commanders want to be on the side of the winner. ☐

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Burhanuddin Rabbani of the Jamiat-i-Islami, unlike the leaders of the other groups, is non-Pushtun, and tends to attract other non-Pushtuns to his organization. Non-Pushtuns make up more than half the Afghan population. Many Westerners and Afghans also see Rabbani as more reasonable than the other fundamentalist leaders, who are often intransigent and bellicose, especially Gulbuddin. Yunus Khalis attracts followers because he is a traditional religious leader and because he is the only exile leader who actually fights in Afghanistan with his men.

### The Moderates

The moderates, like the fundamentalists, cover a wide political spectrum, but on the whole are more religiously tolerant, acknowledge the need for compromise with the USSR, and maintain good connections with the former landowners and ruling classes, as well as with Afghan exile communities in the West. Unlike the fundamentalists, most moderates would be satisfied with restoration of the traditional monarchical system of government that existed in the 1960s; they favor the return of former King Zahir Shah. The moderate leaders were part of the former ruling elite in Afghanistan and have become the center of the resistance movement for those who were part of that social scene. Moderate supporters include former government ministers, other officials, and school teachers. Because the ruling elite was rooted in a tribal-based system, the moderates have better ties to tribal leaders still in Afghanistan.

The relative disorganization of the moderates is both a liability and an asset. They have overlapping command structures that seem to frustrate rather than facilitate decisionmaking. They favor friends and relatives for leadership positions rather than effective leaders. They make no effort to coordinate their fighting in Afghanistan, and the leaders themselves seem more concerned with their religious standing than with running effective guerrilla operations. Many potential followers undoubtedly become exasperated with the chaos.

On the other hand, many of the guerrilla bands who come to Peshawar from Afghanistan would prefer to join an organization that imposes few, if any, restrictions. This is especially true of bands from rural areas where guerrilla activities are already organized around kin, tribal, or village structures. Such bands are interested primarily in obtaining

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arms. The moderates' access to arms is less than that of the  
fundamentalists, but they also can provide equipment and ammunition.

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### **Outlook**

Based on the interviews, we believe the fundamentalists' influence and strength among insurgents will grow while the influence of the moderates will continue to decline. However, the moderates will remain an important influence, particularly in the eastern provinces, because of their tribal connections and support from West European Afghan exiles.

-- The fundamentalists are part of an international Islamic revitalization that is gaining increased followings throughout the Middle East, especially among the young.

-- The fundamentalists are vigorous and bold and have great appeal among Afghan youth in the refugee camps.

-- The moderates represent to the new generation the old elite that failed to lead the country and thus opened the door to Communism.

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